Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
G ambling is relatively socially acceptable in the U.K. and has rarely engendered any concerted religious opposition, in contrast to the U.S. Indeed, much of the gambling activity in the U.K. occurs at street corner betting shops, often in the most fashionable sections of British cities. Two recent events were alleged to have had a deleterious effect on such gambling establishments: (a) the introduction of the U.K. National Lottery in 1994 and (b) the rise of offshore Internet bookmakers, who are not subject to betting taxes and can, thus, seriously undermine the competitive position of traditional bookmakers.
These environmental changes stimulated an important public policy debate in the U.K. regarding optimal levels of taxation for different types of gambling. Similar issues have arisen in the U.S., as states have become increasingly dependent on lottery revenues to fund educational programs (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989) while also viewing casinos as a tool for economic development (Sauer, 2001) .
In order to determine an appropriate response to recent changes in the gambling industry, the U.K. Government commissioned a comprehensive review of betting taxation in 2000 (see Paton, Siegel and Vaughan Williams (2002) ), which resulted in a dramatic change in the taxation of bookmaking establishments. Specifi cally, the government announced in October 2001 that "General Betting Duty" (GBD), levied as a percentage of betting stakes, would be replaced by a "Gross Profi ts Tax" (GPT), based on the net revenue of bookmakers. The change from GBD to GPT signifi cantly reduced the effec-tive level of taxation on bookmakers and ended the direct tax levied on bettors.
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of these changes on the demand for betting. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section contains a brief discussion of recent adjustments to the structure of betting taxation in the U.K. The following section outlines the econometric model that we use to assess the impact of these tax changes on betting demand. The fourth section describes the data and the fi fth section presents our empirical fi ndings. The fi nal section consists of preliminary conclusions and suggestions for additional research.
GAMBLING TAXATION REFORM IN THE U.K.
Betting taxation, by which we mean taxation on bets placed with bookmakers or the Horserace Totalisator Board (the "Tote"), was introduced in the U.K. in 1966. As such, these taxes were applied to wagers on horse racing, dog racing and other sports (mostly soccer) that were placed at street corner bookmaking establishments. Thus, the betting tax, as we defi ne it, excludes wagers placed in casinos, lotteries, or on other games of chance. The tax rate was originally set at 2.5 percent in 1966, and was increased to fi ve percent 18 months later. Although this rate was reduced by a percentage point in 1972, it continued to climb until reaching a peak of eight percent, before being trimmed back to 7.75 percent in 1992 and to 6.75 percent in 1996.
The 1996 reduction was implemented in response to the introduction of the U.K. National Lottery, which was viewed as a threat to street-corner betting establishments. Another critical change occurred in 1987, when the tax on wagers placed at the racetrack was abolished. It is also interesting to note that the effective tax rate on betting was always higher than the standard tax rate charged by the Government because bookmakers levied an additional deduction on bettors' stakes (typically of about two percent) to recoup some of their non-recoverable costs.
The threat to the U.K. bookmaking sector from the National Lottery was exacerbated in the late 1990s by the widespread diffusion of the Internet and the concomitant rise in the use of home personal computers for entertainment. The new technology led to the rise of on-line gambling, which posed a serious threat to the competitive position of "bricks and mortar" gambling establishments. For example, survey evidence (Mintel, 2001, p. 43) suggests that in April, 2001, about 10 percent of UK off-course bettors (defi ned as those who placed bets with bookmakers relating to non-racetrack activities) had used the Internet to place a bet in the previous six months.
In response to these pressures, the U.K. government on October 6, 2001 instituted a radical reform of the taxation structure of U.K. bookmaking, switching from a tax on turnover (revenue) to a tax on gross profi ts. This reform was accompanied by a commitment from the major U.K. bookmakers to abolish deductions on all bets placed with them, so that bettors faced an effective zero tax rate on their wagers. The bookmakers also pledged to close down any part of their operation based outside the jurisdiction of the U.K. tax authorities, i.e., "off-shore" operations. Previously, these operations were able to charge low or zero deductions to bettors on their stakes, severely undercutting U.K.-based Internet and telephone operations. Specifically, the reform involved a switch from a tax on stakes (known as a "General Betting Duty") of 6.75 percent, to a tax on the gross profi ts of bookmakers (money received from bettors minus money paid out to bettors) of 15 percent. Prior to the switch, data supplied to the authors by HM Customs and Excise (the arm of the U.K. government that regulates the taxation of the betting industry) suggests that bookmakers' gross profi ts were approximately 22 percent of total money staked, and so the GBD of 6.75 percent represented approximately 30 percent of gross profi ts. Thus, the switch represented about a halving of the effective rate of taxation faced by bookmakers. Vaughan Williams (2001b, 2002) demonstrate that the key economic rationale for the policy change is that a GPT is allocatively more effi cient than a revenue tax. The former is levied on the effective price of a bet, whereas a revenue tax is levied on quantity. Consequently, a GPT provides fi rms with an incentive to focus on a low-price, highrevenue strategy, instead of a high-price, low-revenue strategy.
Another argument in support of the GPT is that it encourages fi rms to focus on margins (the difference between revenue and payouts), as opposed to revenue. Economic theory predicts that this will result in a lower tax burden in sectors such as online betting, which are extremely competitive and have relatively low profi t margins. Thus, a shift from GBD to GPT is expected to enhance the ability of British bookmakers to compete in a rapidly changing technological and global environment. A corollary of this is that a greater burden of risk is borne by the government under a GPT. The reason is that in a climate of increasing competition, government tax revenue, which is based on profi t margins, may be less stable and predictable.
The U.K. government expected that a gross profi ts tax may actually generate more tax revenue in the long run. That is because they were convinced that reducing risk for the industry and reducing tax rates would enhance industry competitiveness.
To summarize, the British government identifi ed several challenges to the onshore British bookmaking industry, and, therefore, its own medium and long-term betting tax revenue base, from untaxed offshore competition and technological change. In response to these challenges, a radical new betting tax structure was introduced in October 2001. This structure is based on margins rather than revenue, and is designed to allow onshore bookmakers to compete more effectively with offshore rivals.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
As noted earlier, we wish to estimate the impact of the reduction in gambling taxation on betting demand. The purpose of this section is to outline the methodology used to achieve this objective. We also briefl y consider several econometric issues that are relevant to this type of study.
We estimate variants of the following equation for betting demand: In our econometric model, t represents months. This model is quite general, in the sense that it allows for different numbers of lags for the lagged dependent variable, betting price and the price, denoted by k, l and m, in each of the other gambling sectors. The use of lagged variables provides the potential to model dynamic effects. In practice, the lagged variables have very little explanatory power in our empirical models. If the demand function is specifi ed in logarithms, α 0 constitutes a direct estimate of the short-run own price elasticity, which is hypothesized to be negative. β j represents the short run cross price elasticity of demand for betting with respect to the price of sector j. β j < 0 denotes that betting and sector j are complements; β j > 0 indicates that they are substitutes.
The vector Z includes real average monthly earnings (wages) and the monthly unemployment rate, since these factors have been shown in previous studies to infl uence the demand for gambling (e.g., Tuckwell (1984) , Thalheimer and Ali (1995) , Anders, Siegel, and Yacoub (1998) , Vaughan Williams (2001a, 2003) ). Z also contains two dummy variables that allow us to control for two signifi cant events. The fi rst is a dummy for the month of Princess Diana's death, since in the immediate aftermath of this event, gambling activity throughout the U.K declined sharply. The second is a dummy variable for October 2001, the month when the gambling tax changes were fully implemented. This takes account of the publicity that surrounded the tax reduction and may have provided a temporary boost to demand. Given that the tax change was announced in April 2001 and that many betting companies reduced their rate of deductions (though they did not repatriate their overseas operations) in advance of the change, the temporary effect may be evident prior to October of this year. We allow for this by including up to fi ve "leads" of this variable, although for reasons of space we report only the estimates of the aggregate effect.
The inclusion of lagged terms allows us to analyze dynamic factors. For example, if gambling is "addictive," its long-run price elasticity may exceed its short-run value. In the simplest case, in which only one lag of the dependent variable is included and there is no lagged price term, the long-run elasticity will be equal to α 0 /(1 -γ 1 ). A concern associated with estimation of equation [1] is that the price variables are unlikely to be exogenous. If the exogeneity assumption is violated, ordinary least squares (OLS) yields parameter estimates that are biased and ineffi cient. Two alternative estimators that can be used to address this problem are two-stage least squares (2SLS) and system estimators (Greene, 2000) .
Although system estimators are likely to generate more effi cient parameter estimates, mis-specifi cation in one equation (for example, due to serial correlation) can affect parameter estimates of other equations. We prefer to risk the loss of some effi ciency in return for greater reliability, so we report 2SLS estimates. In a footnote to the table reporting regression results, we identify each variable that is instrumented and the set of instruments used. In cases in which the number of additional instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables, we report the Sargan test for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. For each variant of the regression model, we also report White standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. Note also that we have chosen a log-linear specifi cation for equation [1] , since this allows the coeffi cients to be interpreted as elasticities. As it turns out, our key fi ndings are robust to the use of a linear specifi cation.
The convention in the academic literature on gambling (see, for example, Farrell et al. (1999) , Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2000a , 2000b ) Forrest, Simmons and Chesters (2002 ) is to measure "price" as one minus the expected value of a bet. This is typically computed as the percentage of a unit bet that, on average, is not returned to bettors. In some instances, however, we have selected instruments for price. Specifi cally, the price of the main National Lottery draw is instrumented by the value of rollover and additional draws in that month. Rollovers occur when the jackpot prize is not won and is carried or "rolled over" to the subsequent draw. Such an event is a useful instrument as it is clearly exogenous to demand but has a direct impact on price.
When the appropriate data are not available, several alternative approaches are possible. For example, in the case of betting, data are available only on the tax rate, which is a signifi cant determinant of price. This allows us to directly estimate the elasticity of betting demand with respect to the tax rate. Another advantage of using the tax rate is that this variable is exogenous and does not require the use of instruments. For bingo, Lottery Scratchcards, the Lottery Thunderball draw, and the Lottery Extra draw we have no data relating directly to price changes. For various Lottery products, we use dummy variables to denote time periods when such products have been available on the market. These events are clearly exogenous and can be used to determine substitution or complementarity in the demand equations for other sectors in the gambling industry. In the case of bingo, we use demand in place of price in the demand equations for other sectors. As bingo demand may be endogenous, we instrument this variable by lagged demand. Although bingo demand is correlated across time periods, it is not clear that this variable is a valid instrument. Thus, we view our results regarding substitution from bingo to betting as somewhat speculative.
We consider several approaches to control for time effects. The fi rst is to include a standard linear time trend. This approach, however, is somewhat restrictive in that it is based on the assumption that the trend is constant throughout the sample period. To some extent, this problem may be mitigated by the inclusion of a quadratic term. A more general approach, though, is to use a piecewise linear "spline." This approach involves dividing the time period into a pre-specifi ed number (n) of sub-periods and then constructing a linear function for each sub-period. The linear functions are restricted so that they join together at certain threshold values or 'knots' (see Greene (2000, pp. 322-5) ). Below, we use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to choose the appropriate specifi cation of the time trend (including the value of n where appropriate). Accordingly, we only report results from the best specifi cation. In general, however, the specifi cation of the time trend had only a marginal impact on our results.
The fi nal econometric issue concerns the specifi cation of the demand equation. We follow the "general-to-specifi c" approach. That is, we begin by estimating a model with all potential explanatory variables. This includes up to four lags for the price variables and the lagged dependent variable. Next, we eliminate variables that have little or no explanatory power, which results in a more parsimonious fi nal model. Specifi cally, we drop variables sequentially on the basis of the t-value associated with each coeffi cient, ceasing only when all t-values are signifi cantly different to zero at the 10 percent level or better. At each stage, we test for specifi cation problems: autocorrelation, ARCH effects, normality and heteroscedasticity. If the omission of an insignifi cant variable results in the diagnosis of specifi cation problems, we retain the insignifi cant variable in the model. We will present estimates of the most general specifi cation and the fi nal, parsimonious specifi cation. For reasons of space, we only report results including the lagged variables where these have significant explanatory power.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Data on betting revenue were derived from the monthly tax reports provided by HM Customs and Excise. Until October 2001, the tax on betting was levied as a proportion of revenue. Consequently, data on tax receipts, along with knowledge of tax rates, allow us to derive total off-course betting revenue for each month from April 1987 to September 2001. Note that prior to April 1987, tax was payable on bets placed with bookmakers at the racetrack (called "on-course betting") and, thus, fi gures are not comparable. After October 2001, HM Customs and Excise provided us with total revenue fi gures for betting directly. Revenue is defl ated by the monthly retail price index, using January 2002 as our base month. We also test for seasonal effects and adjust betting revenue by running preliminary regressions of revenue on month dummies. Controls are also included in the econometric model for the number of Saturdays in each month and for the month of the Grand National, an iconic horse rate that attracts easily more betting interest than any other event in the year.
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The tax rate is defi ned as tax receipts as a percentage of betting revenue. Note that the switch from taxing revenue to taxing gross profi ts means that the basis for computing this measure changed in October 2001. Prior to this, the tax rate is equal to the rate of GBD. After October 2001, the rate is computed as tax receipts from GPT divided by actual betting revenue.
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The Lottery price is computed as the mean expected value of a lottery ticket in draws taking place in that month. The expected value is calculated using the method used in Forrest et al. (2000a) . Prices from some other important gambling sectors, i.e., amusement machines and casinos, are more problematic. Duty on amusement machines is levied as a license fee per machine. Thus, we construct a series of the mean license rate per machine. Similarly, the tax on casino gambling is levied via a license fee on establishments, where the size of the fee is related to total turnover. This tax is payable over a six-month accounting period with some interim payments also being due. Since 1987, the license rates changed in October 1991 and then again in April of 1998 April of , 1999 April of , 2000 April of and 2001 . Most of these changes were fairly modest in nature and were basically adjustments for infl ation. An exception was the change in April 1998, which represented a signifi cant increase in the overall rate of duty. In the econometric analysis presented below, we construct a dummy variable for this change and use this to estimate substitution effects.
As discussed above, the available data do not permit us to construct a meaningful measure of the price for bingo. Instead, we use bingo revenue, instrumented by its lagged values, in the econometric model. Data on bingo revenue subject to duty are derived from information provided by HM Customs and Excise. 4 In Figure 1 , we present the monthly series of betting revenue for January 1999 through August 2002. This fi gure suggests that, as expected, the tax reduction had a signifi cant impact on betting revenue. The upward trend in the series appears to commence some time prior to the actual change in tax. There is anecdotal evidence that some smaller bookmakers anticipated the change, and reduced betting deductions in advance of the tax reduction. There is no evidence, however, that any of the established bookmakers began repatriating their operations before the tax changes were formally announced. Further, there is certainly no evidence or indication to suggest that the increase in revenues prior to the tax change is in any way attributable to, say, more honest reporting by bookmakers or any changes in the way that revenues were reported. We will explore this issue econometrically in the next section of the paper.
Although the tax change only directly affected betting, there may have been indirect impacts on other gambling sectors. To assess these effects, we present Figures 2 to 4, which are monthly revenue series for lottery draws, scratchcards, and bingo, respectively. Figure 2 , the lottery draw series, provides evidence of a slight downward trend after October 2001. For bingo and scratchcards, it is much more diffi cult to pick up any impact from the tax change. In general, the evidence presented in these fi gures is inconsistent with the notion that there have been substantial declines in revenue in segments of the gambling industry other than betting. Lastly, in Figure  5 , we present the corresponding series of monthly tax receipts from betting. The reduction in the effective tax rate appears to have had a signifi cant impact on receipts, reducing them by about one third on the previous year. In other words, the increase in betting revenue does not appear to have been large enough to compensate the taxation authorities fully for the decrease in tax rates.
In the next section of the paper, we construct multivariate models of the turnover series to analyze the impact of the tax reduction more fully.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Parameter estimates of the demand equation (equation [1] ) are presented in Table 1 . A description of the variables used in our regression analysis is contained in the Data Appendix.
Several points should be made about the results presented in Table 1 . The fi rst is that the empirical analysis is based on (vi) ***indicates signifi cance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, and the * 10% level.
Entire Period
Lottery Period
monthly data, although fi gures for September, October, and November 2001 are approximate (due to aggregation by HM Customs and Excise). A second point is that the model was estimated for the entire sample period (April 1987 to January 2002) and then just for the period during which U.K. National Lottery tickets have been sold (November 1994 to January 2002). Columns (1) and (2) present fi ndings for the entire sample period, while columns (3) and (4) contain results for the "Lottery Period." In columns (1) and (3), we include controls for other forms of betting, while these factors are excluded in (2) and (4). Other things being equal, the parsimonious specifi cation will provide effi cient estimates. However, omitting seemingly insignifi cant variables carries with it a (small) probability of a Type II error. Given that consequences for parameter estimates of erroneously omitting relevant variables are more serious than the consequences of erroneously including irrelevant variables, we believe it is useful to present both the more general and the parsimonious specifi cations. Another stylized fact generated by these fi ndings is that there was an absence of any signifi cant differences between long-run and short-run effects, which could be due to our use of monthly data. Finally, we note that each variant of the model fi ts quite well, as the R 2 values range from 0.7133 to 0.8722.
As expected, the coeffi cient on the betting tax variable is negative and highly statistically signifi cant in each of the four specifi cations of the model. Our estimates of the tax elasticity are between -0.502 and -0.555. These results suggest that a 50 percent reduction in the tax rate on betting will result in a 25 percent increase in the demand for betting. The elasticity estimates imply a price elasticity (in absolute terms) for betting that is signifi cantly higher than unity. For example, based on the mean price and duty levels over the sample period, the betting price elasticity estimates are -1.59 and -1.62.
Note that our estimates imply that the tax and price elasticities are different. The reason for this is that tax represents only a part of the total price. For example, assume that the total price of a one-dollar bet is 20 cents and 10 cents of this is the tax. Assume that the tax goes up to 15 cents and this is fully passed on to the bettor. Thus, the new price is 25 cents. This causes demand to decrease by, say, 50 percent. Price has increased by 25 percent, so the price elasticity is two. Tax has increased by 50 percent, so the tax elasticity is one.
Another key fi nding is that the coefficients on the October 2001 dummy variable are positive and statistically signifi cant in each variant of the model. This implies that the tax change announced in October 2001 induced an increase in demand for onshore betting. The coeffi cients on the lags of this variable (suppressed in Table 1) imply that this event began to register fi ve months before the actual implementation of the tax changes.
Two caveats to these results should be noted. First, it is conceivable that some of the increase in onshore betting experienced by domestic booking establishments consists of betting activity that had been transacted by offshore branches of these same bookmaking fi rms. To the extent that this is occurring, a non-negligible percentage of the increase in betting may refl ect not "new" demand, but, rather, this transfer from offshore to onshore betting outlets. Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate out such effects in the data that were provided to us.
An additional caveat is that the tax reduction was accompanied by bookmakers removing the deduction charged on each bet. Thus, at fi rst glance, the reduction in tax paid by bettors was greater than that measured in the betting tax variable employed in the regression equation and this could impart an upward bias on our elasticity estimates. However, allowance should also be made for the possibility that bookmakers may have adjusted the odds (prices) they offer, with the intent of passing on some of the incidence of the new tax to bettors. To clarify, it is typical for a bookmaker to set odds about each possible outcome such that the sum of the probabilities implied in the odds is greater than unity (the extent by which they exceed unity is commonly known as the "overround"). For example, if a bookmaker offers odds of four to one (an implied probability of 0.2) about each of the six possible outcomes of the throw of a die, the sum of the implied probabilities is 1.2 (6 × 0.2). In this case, the "overround" is 0.2 There is some evidence that the size of this "overround" has in fact fallen since the changes introduced to betting taxation, though there is less agreement about the relevance of the change in the theoretical margin for actual profi tability (see Betfair (2003)).
The other parameter estimates are generally consistent with our expectations. That is, for the entire sample period, there appears to be an inverse relationship between unemployment and demand, and a positive relationship between wages and demand. The insignifi cance of the coeffi cients on the National Lottery dummy variables suggests that that the introduction of the Lottery had little impact on betting revenue. Only the introduction of Wednesday draws appears to be associated with a statistically signifi cant decline in the demand for betting. On the other hand, we fi nd strong evidence of a response in the demand for betting to price changes in the National Lottery, as evidenced by the fact that the coeffi cients on Lottery Price are positive and statistically signifi cant. Specifi cally, estimates of the cross price elasticity of betting with respect to the National Lottery are between +0.355 and +0.396. This result is consistent with U.S.-based evidence of substitution between the lottery and other forms of gambling (Siegel and Anders, 2001 ). We find no evidence of substitution from machines or casino gambling to betting. Recalling that we have bingo demand in the model, the positive coeffi cient on this variable provides evidence of complementarity between bingo and betting, although this coeffi cient is insignifi cant when we restrict the analysis to the Lottery period. Lastly, as expected, gambling activity was significantly lower in the month of Princess Diana's death.
In assessing our results, it is important to note that we are only estimating the demand for onshore betting in the U.K. Given that the betting tax changes implemented in October 2001 were at least partially the result of agreement on the part of major U.K. bookmakers to repatriate their offshore operations in the wake of the tax changes, this caveat is especially critical in distinguishing the causes of the increased demand. Even so, from the point of view of the taxing authorities any tax generated through increased domestic demand can be considered in equal terms whatever its origin. At the same time, U.K. bookmakers agreed to end deductions on bettors, so that the GPT was covered entirely by the operators themselves. The impact of enhanced market competition, arising notably due to the rapid increase in the number of bookmakers operating on the Internet as well as the growing availability and sophistication of price-comparison sites (enabling bettors to identify the best odds available from a range of bookmakers), must also be considered as a key factor influencing bookmakers' profit margins. This has consequent effects on the price elasticity of demand for betting.
CONCLUSIONS
A rapid rise in gambling has heightened interest in identifying demand characteristics and optimal levels of taxation. In this paper, we present some preliminary econometric evidence on the demand re-sponse of betting activities in the U.K. to recent changes in the structure of betting taxation. A key result is that the demand for betting appears to be highly sensitive to changes in tax rates. In particular, the reduction in the rate of betting tax in October 2001 appears to have induced a fairly large increase in the demand for onshore betting.
Our fi ndings also imply that betting in street-corner gambling establishments and the lottery are strong substitutes, at least in the short run. Unfortunately, given our somewhat short "post-event" window, it is diffi cult for us to project long-term impacts.
The issues discussed in this paper could be even more important in the U.S. than in the U.K. That is because gambling policies are typically resolved at the state level, since state legislatures have jurisdiction over most aspects of gambling. The last two decades have seen intense competition among the states to generate additional gambling revenues from riverboat and Native American casinos, lotteries, and video poker games to attract gambling patrons. This has probably resulted in stronger substitution effects, since motorists can easily patronize gambling establishments or play the lottery in neighboring states. Furthermore, there is likely to be greater interest in estimating such impacts in the U.S., due to the recent fairly severe recession. This economic downturn has heightened state level concerns regarding tax revenue and the possibility that there may be displacement effects associated with the growth of gambling. These displacement effects are a major concern, as many U.S. states have become increasingly dependent on lotteries to fund educational programs.
Finally, it is interesting to note that tax revenue from gambling pales in comparison to tax revenue that is generated from alcohol, gasoline, and tobacco. Thus, in determining optimal tax policies, it would be useful to extend our model to include these commodities. This would allow us to determine whether alcohol, gasoline, and tobacco are substitutes or complements for betting. DATA APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
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